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ABSTRACT 
With the proliferation of digital based evidence, the need for the timely identification, analysis and 
interpretation of digital evidence is becoming more crucial. In many investigations critical information is 
required while at the scene or within a short period of time - measured in hours as opposed to days. The 
traditional cyber forensics approach of seizing a system(s)/media, transporting it to the lab, making a 
forensic image(s), and then searching the entire system for potential evidence, is no longer appropriate in 
some circumstances. In cases such as child abductions, pedophiles, missing or exploited persons, time is 
of the essence. In these types of cases, investigators dealing with the suspect or crime scene need 
investigative leads quickly; in some cases it is the difference between life and death for the victim(s). 
The Cyber Forensic Field Triage Process Model (CFFTPM) proposes an onsite or field approach for 
providing the identification, analysis and interpretation of digital evidence in a short time frame, without 
the requirement of having to take the system(s)/media back to the lab for an in-depth examination or 
acquiring a complete forensic image(s). The proposed model adheres to commonly held forensic 
principles, and does not negate the ability that once the initial field triage is concluded, the 
system(s)/storage media be transported back to a lab environment for a more thorough examination and 
analysis. The CFFTPM has been successfully used in various real world cases, and its investigative 
importance and pragmatic approach has been amply demonstrated. Furthermore, the derived evidence 
from these cases has not been challenged in the court proceedings where it has been introduced. The 
current article describes the CFFTPM in detail, discusses the model’s forensic soundness, investigative 
support capabilities and practical considerations. 
Keywords: Computer forensics, process model, triage, computer crime, cyber crime, digital evidence 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Computer crime is an unfortunate artifact of today’s wired and global society. It is no surprise that 
individuals involved in deviant and or criminal behavior have embraced technology as a method for 
improving or extending their criminal tradecraft. With the proliferation of technology, our notions of 
evidence and what constitutes potential sources of evidence are drastically changing. Gone are the 
days when evidence was primarily document based. Today, and going forward, evidence is becoming 
more electronic or digital based. This is true for all investigations, not just those we commonly 
associate with crimes that use or are directed toward a computer, network or IT infrastructure.  
There have been several investigative models developed to assist law enforcement in dealing with the 
shift from document based to digital based evidence (cf. Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Beebe & Clarke, 
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2004; Reith, Carr, & Gunsch, 2002; Rogers, 2006; Stephenson, 2003). These various models have 
assumed that the entire investigative process for computer forensics would be undertaken (see Figure 
1). This can be extremely time consuming given the volume of data to examine and in most cases it 
involves the transfer of the system(s) or a forensic copy(s) of the data located on the storage media to a 
lab environment for a thorough examination and analysis.  While this method may work in situations 
where time is not overly critical, it is not sufficient in time critical situations. Examples of these time 
critical situations include child abductions, missing persons, death threats etc. In these situations the 
need for quick information and investigative leads outweighs the need for an in-depth analysis of all 
the potential digital evidence back in a laboratory environment. 
 
Figure 1 – Traditional Process Models 
In order to meet the demand for timely information derived from digital sources a different process 
model is proposed that is based on forensically sound principles and at the same time is sensitive to 
time constraints (i.e., critical investigative information can be derived in a short timeframe).  The 
proposed model can be conducted on scene which provides the added benefit of having a feedback 
loop with the investigators; this allows the computer forensics analyst to modify their searches based 
on input from the primary investigators and those in direct contact with the suspect. 
2. BACKGROUND  
The development of the current process model was guided not only by the perceived need by the law 
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enforcement community, but also from the formalization of a novel investigative approach that was 
being used in real investigations by agents working with the Southern Indiana Assistant U.S. 
Attorney’s office – USADA Steve Debrota. This office had been involved in several cases where the 
quick and efficient examination of digital evidence was crucial to the case and the investigative leads 
that were generated on site (at the suspect’s dwelling) were critical to the success of the operation, in 
securing a conviction of the offender and to protecting future victims. The USADA’s office 
approached the Cyber Forensic Program housed in the Computer and Information Technology 
Department at Purdue University and the National White Collar Crime Center for assistance. The 
successful and pragmatic approach needed to be articulated and structured into a formal process model 
in order for it to be replicated in other jurisdictions, and in order for it to be properly evaluated and 
matured. The approach has been formalized into the computer forensics field triage process model.  
The formalization of the model was evaluated by 20 State and Local Law Enforcement Officers from 
Indiana who took part in a two-day seminar offered at Purdue University during the fall of 2005. The 
model was presented to the officers over the course of two days and the feedback was overwhelmingly 
positive.  
3. PROCESS MODEL 
The computer forensics field triage process model (CFFTPM) is defined as:  
Those investigative processes that are conducted within the first few hours of an investigation, that 
provide information used during the suspect interview and search execution phase. Due to the need for 
information to be obtained in a relatively short time frame, the model usually involves an on site/field 
analysis of the computer system(s) in question. 
The foci of the model are to: 
1. Find useable evidence immediately; 
2. Identify victims at acute risk; 
3. Guide the ongoing investigation; 
4. Identify potential charges; and 
5. Accurately assess the offender’s danger to society. 
While at the same time protecting the integrity of the evidence and/or potential evidence for further 
examination and analysis. 
Being able to conduct an examination and analysis on scene, in a short period of time and provide 
investigators with time sensitive leads and information provides a powerful psychological advantage 
to the investigative team. Suspects are psychologically more vulnerable within the first few hours of 
their initial contact with police, especially when this contact occurs in their place of business or 
dwelling (Yeschke, 2003). They tend to be more cooperative and open to answering questions even 
after being “Mirandized”. This cooperation can be critical in certain cases such as abductions, sexual 
predatory offenses etc. What is crucial to the investigator during this initial time period is the 
knowledge of the full extent of the crime and/or involvement of the suspect and “triggers” that further 
increase the suspect’s willingness to talk and cooperate. These triggers may be found in the digital 
evidence located on the suspect’s system(s) (e.g., email correspondence, digital maps, pictures, chat 
logs). 
The CFFTPM uses phases derived from the Carrier and Spafford (2002) Integrated Digital 
Investigation Process model (IDIP) and the Digital Crime Scene Analysis (DCSA) model as 
developed by Rogers (2006). The phases include: planning, triage, usage/user profiles, 
chronology/timeline, Internet activity, and case specific evidence (see Figure 2).  These six phases 
constitute a high level of categorization and each phase has several sub-tasks and considerations that 
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vary according to the specifics of the case, file system and operating system under investigation, etc. 
The use of higher order categories allows the process model to be generalized across various types of 
investigations that deal with digital evidence. The need for a general model has been identified in 
several studies as a core component of a practical/pragmatic approach for law enforcement 
investigations (ISTS, 2004; Rogers & Seigfried, 2004; Stambaugh, H., Beaupre, D., Icove, D., Baker, 
R., Cassaday, W., & Williams, W., 2001).  
 
 
Figure 2 -  CFFTPM Phases 
 
Before discussing each of the model’s phases it is important that qualifications be placed around the 
use of the CFFTPM, as the model is not appropriate for all investigative situations. 
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3.1 Considerations 
As with any other type of investigation there are several considerations that must be made prior to 
deciding the most effective and efficient method. Two primary areas of consideration are legal and 
technical/operational considerations. Legal considerations include the scope and particulars of the 
warrant or order. Does the warrant allow for the seizure and removal of the system(s)? Is there 
sufficient particularity in the warrant and application for the warrant that allows for an onsite or in situ 
examination? Are there any 4th Amendment issues that need to be addressed? What are the reporting 
obligations to the issuing magistrate or judge? Are there particular discovery issues present or 
anticipated? Another important consideration is whether conducting an onsite examination affects the 
integrity of the original evidence. It is only when these and other potential legal issues are sorted out 
that the feasibility of using the CFFTPM can be determined. These legal considerations obviously 
necessitate that investigators and legal counsel work together throughout the entire case. 
Technical/operational considerations include but are by no means limited to: The type of case? How 
critical is the time factor? What are the skills and abilities of the computer forensic examiners? What 
type of technology is involved (standalone systems, complex networks etc.)? Can the scene be safely 
and effectively controlled? Can the systems in question be powered off or must they remain “live”? 
What is the technical skill and knowledge level of the suspect? Do the computer forensic examiners 
have the proper equipment for onsite examinations? As was stated with legal considerations, these 
questions need to be considered before deciding to use the CFFTPM approach. 
It is also important to understand that the CFFTPM does not preclude transporting the system(s) or 
storage media back to a lab environment for a more thorough and exacting examination and analysis. 
The procedures used in the CFFTPM adhere to the forensic principles of minimizing the 
contamination of the original scene and evidence, maintaining the integrity of digital evidence, 
maintaining the chain of custody of evidence, and complying with rules of evidence for admissibility 
at the Federal and State levels. In many cases a two step process is appropriate and prudent, where step 
one is the CFFTPM conducted at the scene to provide time sensitive investigative and interview leads 
and then step two being a secondary more traditional examination and analysis back at the lab in order 
to make a more exact determination of events and evidentiary locations in a more controlled 
environment. 
4. PHASES 
Due to length constraints the discussion will only provide a brief description of the six phases and key 
sub-tasks. The primary investigative/examination considerations that are pertinent for each of the 
phases will also be presented. 
4.1 Planning  
The first phase in the CFFTPM is proper prior planning. Ideally, a lead investigator will have a matrix 
that quantifies the various possibilities of the crime scene, the suspect and the digital evidence and 
qualifies the expertise of the various investigators on the investigation team. For the lead investigator, 
this matrix is used to define what is known and what is not known thus aiding in determining what is 
wanted to be known. Similar to a Situation paragraph of a military Operations Order (OpOrd), this 
matrix identifies the “enemy” and “friendly” situations providing preemptive case intelligence. In the 
OpOrd, the enemy is defined characteristically by collecting intelligence through the acronym 
SALUTE: Strength, Activity, Location, Uniform, Time, and Equipment. This same acronym can be 
used in gathering case intelligence about the enemy/suspect prior to arriving at the crime scene.  
Strength initially determines the suspect count and any other involved cohorts (specific numbers can 
be helpful), but could also include known or possible capabilities of the suspect. Activity defines the 
specific actions of the suspect (even small details could later be important). Location is not only the 
physical location of the scene, but also the virtual possibilities of cyberspace. Uniform relates more to 
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the military, but in terms of cyberspace it can include email addresses, Uniform Resource Locators 
(URLs), usernames, passwords, network domains and other related deterministic markings, symbols, 
or corporate or agency identifiers. Time obviously builds upon other previously gathered case 
intelligence providing the chronological scope for investigative searches. Finally, Equipment covers 
the various types of wired and wireless hardware devices and software applications that can be 
expected when approaching the digital crime scene. Dependent upon the case intelligence determined 
from the SALUTE, the lead investigator will have many specific decisions to make prior to arriving at 
the crime scene.  
Once the enemy/suspect elements of the SALUTE matrix are determined, the lead investigator can 
then identify friendly information for attacking this crime scene. From the OpOrd, this section of the 
matrix includes the mission of the investigation, the identification of the necessary personnel to 
provide the expertise for the investigation, and the knowledge of how to handle the unexpected. The 
mission of the investigation is normally determined by the type of crime committed in turn 
determining the level of investigation and the level of expertise necessary for the investigation. If the 
crime warrants expertise in multiple physical and virtual locations, multiple wired and wireless 
networks, multiple OS, personal digital technologies, or other specific technical needs, the investigator 
can plan accordingly. However, if there are unknowns in the investigation, it is imperative that the 
lead investigator determines who else can be contacted to aid in the investigation. With this compiled 
situational case intelligence, both about the suspect and the investigative team, the lead investigator 
can then formulate a plan of attack for determining what evidence is to be sought after and used to 
further the investigation. 
4.2. Triage 
Once the appropriate planning has been completed, the investigative process moves to those phases 
that deal more directly with the actual suspect or crime scene (depending upon the case).  For the sake 
of our discussion it is assumed that the scene has been properly secured and controlled. Here the scene 
refers to both the physical and the digital (cf. Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Lee, Palmbach, & Miller, 
2001; Rogers, 2006). 
Since time is a crucial factor in the CFTTPM, it is extremely important that some sort of initial 
prioritization be undertaken. An effective and time-tested approach is to follow the medical triage 
model.  In the medical field triage refers to: 
“A process for sorting injured people into groups based on their need for or likely benefit from 
immediate medical treatment. Triage is used in hospital emergency rooms, on battlefields, and at 
disaster sites when limited medical resources must be allocated.” (AHD, 2000) 
For our purposes triage can be distilled down to: 
A process in which things are ranked in terms of importance or priority. Essentially, those items, 
pieces of evidence or potential containers of evidence that are the most important or the most 
volatile need to be dealt with first. 
The triage phase is fundamental to the process model and along with proper planning it is the 
foundation upon which the other phases are built. The investigator needs to re-verify that the CFFTPM 
approach is still valid. Potential containers of evidence (e.g., computer systems, storage media and 
devices) need to be identified and prioritized based on the criteria of potential relevant evidence that 
can be obtained in a reasonably short time frame, and/or evidence with a short time to live (e.g., data 
in volatile memory, process tables, routing tables, temporary files systems). The investigators and 
interviewers who are dealing directly with the suspect or witnesses need to be providing direct input to 
the computer forensic examiner at this stage. This ensures that correct prioritizations and assumptions 
are being made. 
For the remainder of the discussion it will be assumed that the computer forensic examiner has access 
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to a forensic examination workstation or laptop that they have brought, a hardware write blocker to 
ensure that any storage media that is examined is done so in read only mode (thus ensuring that no 
contamination is occurring), and the computer forensic examiner has access to software tools that 
allow them to conduct field examinations (e.g., EnCase, FTK, ProDiscover, Sleuthkit, Filehound). 
4.3 Usage/User Profiles 
Once a system or storage media has been identified and prioritized during the triage phase, the actual 
examination and analysis are conducted. When compelling evidence is found on digital media, it is 
essential to show a link between that evidence and a specific, identifiable suspect1. In some cases, this 
is almost a fait accompli; for example, when it can be clearly shown that only one person had physical 
access to a PC. In many cases, multiple persons have access to a PC, making it necessary to find and 
examine digital artifacts and their properties to ascertain which individual or individuals are 
responsible for, or even had knowledge of, incriminating data found on the storage media.  Often it is 
necessary to place artifacts in context with verifiable real world events.  The payoff can be significant.  
A suspect presented with clear evidence indicating that he or she, and no other person is responsible 
for evidence recovered during an interview may feel compelled to admit their guilt.   
This challenge has always existed, and is an essential element of most “traditional” examinations of 
digital evidence.  In the context of the computer forensics field triage process model, the challenge is 
not only to do this quickly, but to expeditiously determine if it can even be done within the time 
constraints. (In some cases, the specifics of the evidence can obviate the need for this evaluation, for 
example when contraband files are found only in a specific user’s home directory).  A thorough 
knowledge of user profiles and artifacts relating to usage, are essential to accomplishing this goal. 
It is not always necessary or fruitful to evaluate user profiles.  In determining the need and the most 
time efficient approach, several questions need to be asked: How many people use (have access to) the 
PC? How many user accounts are there? The answers to the first two are often not the same, leading to 
a third question, how many or which accounts are shared by more than one individual? Obviously in 
any case where more than one individual is able to log in to the same account, evaluating user profiles 
in and of itself, will not be sufficient to establish culpability for, or even a suspect’s knowledge of 
incriminating artifacts.  It may be necessary to use the dates and times associated with incriminating 
artifacts and put them in context with the dates and times a suspect had access to the PC, or could 
reliably said not to have had access to a PC.   Special care must be taken when attaching significance 
to dates and times recovered from digital evidence.  This will be discussed further in the “Timeline” 
section of this paper. At the other extreme, if it can be firmly established that only one individual had 
access to a PC, the examiner can dispense with evaluating user profiles, and allocate the time budgeted 
to more fruitful avenues of search. 
Loosely put, a user profile is a collection of files, folders, registry keys, and file properties that are 
exclusively associated with a unique user account.  The value of, and speed at which these items can 
be evaluated will vary widely depending on case specifics, available tools, and specific knowledge and 
experience of the examiner.   
4.3.1 Home Directory 
In Microsoft Widows operating systems, the most obvious user related artifact is the “Home 
Directory”.  By default, the home directory is only accessible only by the associated user account.  
Also by default, the location of stored files associated with various applications is set to a subfolder 
inside the home directory.  The presence of incriminating files in the suspect’s home directory or one 
of it’s subfolders (Including such notables as “desktop” “my documents” and “favorites”) is a reliable 
indicator that only the suspect (or anyone who could log onto that account) had access to those files. 
                                                 
1 The discussion will be constrained to standalone systems running a Microsoft Windows environment, since this represents 
the majority of the training and systems encountered by law enforcement investigators (Rogers & Scarborough, 2006). 
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Additionally, the creation of a subdirectory structure with unique subfolder names can go a long way 
towards showing knowledge of and culpability for evidentiary objects found in the subdirectory 
structure (DeBrota, 2005). 
4.3.2 File Properties (security) 
It may be useful and time-efficient to check ownership and security properties of objects with known 
evidentiary value. The ability to set and read security permissions is not available in FAT, and is off 
by default in Windows XP (National White Collar Crime Center, 2003), even when the NTFS file 
system is used.  When NTFS is used, and the feature turned on, a file’s security properties, most 
notably “owner” and “permissions” may be useful in establishing which account had access to, or even 
created that particular file (National White Collar Crime Center, 2003).  When a file is created, the 
user account logged on is recorded as the “owner” as part of the file’s security descriptor (This can be 
changed only if an Administrator “takes ownership” of the file, in which case the Administrator is 
recorded as the owner).  Permissions may also be of limited usefulness in establishing culpability. 
Only those accounts with the permission to do so may access an object, however this can be one or 
more user accounts, and the accounts that have permission to the object may change over time.  An 
account that had “read” access on the 25th of January might not have had that same access on the 24th.  
4.3.3 Registry 
The registry can be a trap, causing the needless expenditure of valuable time, if the examiner does not 
have a precise idea of what they are looking for and exactly where to go to find it.  On the other hand, 
a knowledgeable examiner with a clear vision of what information they want to recover can find 
several highly valuable items in less than a few minutes (National White Collar Crime Center, 2005).  
For example, the HKEY_USERS\suspect’s SID\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs key and associated sub-keys contain a fairly comprehensive list of 
files that were opened while that account was logged on.  This is a strong indicator that a suspect had 
knowledge of all files that were viewed, but requires that the examiner knows or can quickly and 
reliably identify the NTUSER.DAT file associated with the user’s account.     
Depending on the circumstances and resources available, examining the user profile may be the most 
costly part of the examination in terms of time expended, however it is often an indispensable 
operation as well. 
4.4 Chronology/Timeline 
The chronological scope of the investigation can be defined by the case intelligence. In an 
investigation, digital evidence is defined by its temporal value, known as MAC times (Casey, 2004). 
Without going into a detailed narrative of the specifics of MAC times specifically to each OS, the 
following are some general guidelines for Windows MAC Times. Windows MAC times are defined in 
the FAT32 and NTFS file systems as: 
• Modification is defined by when a file contents has been changed  
• Access time is defined by when a file was viewed 
• Created time is defined by when a file was created 
Although MAC times appear simple, it is well-documented (Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 
2005;Vacca, 2002) that there are many inconsistencies with MAC times and there are various other 
vulnerabilities when describing other vendor specific operating systems, such as those used on 
personal digital technologies devices (e.g., PDAs, Cellphones, MP3 players). 
Once an investigator gains access to the files in question and their individual MAC times, they can 
start to qualify their searches, thus quantifying their evidence (Casey, 2004).  For the CFFTPM, 
several quantifications should be examined by sorting the files on their various MAC times within the 
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chronological scope of the investigation. The first such quantification includes the time periods of 
normal use by the suspect and other known users of the computer or device (Casey, 2004; Farmer & 
Venema, 2005).  This can be obtained by correlating known users accessing the computer with files 
that have been modified, accessed or created during those times. Organization by user or by time 
period helps to quantify who was doing what during what time periods. Such organization may also 
provide time periods that stand out or look unique. These types of unique time periods could be 
studied outward in an attempt to find other significant relationships or value. 
Another quantification includes the identification and analysis of software applications and data files 
used or accessed during qualified times of interest (Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 2005; Vacca, 
2002). Again, this can be obtained by correlating known users with MAC times possibly providing 
unique time periods that could be of significant value. Organization of applications or files within a 
certain time period quantify activities that occurred during these time periods. An application or file 
that is accessed prior to, during or after a criminal incident can be a major indication of involvement or 
intent. 
Finally, the third quantification includes the identification and analysis of recent shortcuts and stored 
information (Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 2005; Vacca, 2002). These could include, but are not 
limited to items on the desktop, commonly used software applications, and the various locations of 
Internet browser cookies, cache, and the index.dat file. Note that various Internet structures (cookies, 
cache and the index.dat file) can be very useful in determining chronological intelligence in that these 
provide much more time-based evidence than just MAC times. Specifically, each Index.dat file 
provides date-time stamps for each Internet server request.  
For clarification, it should be noted that time is maintained differently in different operating systems 
and versions, system clocks do drift and are easily corrupted, and knowledge of time zones and time 
changes is essential to any digital investigation  (Casey, 2001; Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 2005; 
Vacca, 2002). Finally, in defining the case through chronology, there is a need to establish a 
provenance of the information and correlate events based on an absolute time determined by some 
piece of physical evidence (Casey, 2004; Vacca, 2002).  
4.5 Internet  
Almost every case will require an examination of artifacts associated with Internet activity, such as 
instant messaging (IM), e-mail and web browsing.  The value, time cost, and time criticality will vary 
widely, depending on circumstances including the specific applications involved, type of activity 
being examined, and whether the PC being examined belongs to a suspect or a victim (e.g., in a 
missing persons case).  An effective practice is for the computer forensic examiner to evaluate what 
type of Internet activities they believe the suspect (or victim) was involved in, and to evaluate if and 
how each of those activities relates to the case.   Types of activities may include web browsing, e-mail, 
instant messaging, reading or posting to USENET newsgroups, trading files. 
4.5.1 Browser Artifacts 
While the specifics vary, most web browsing applications store some method for storing “cookies”, 
either as a file or as separate files, some means of storing temporary Internet files, and some means of 
storing user information and preferences, such as typed Uniform Resource Locator (URLs) and 
“favorites”. The specific content of individual cookies is determined by each individual website and is 
rarely of evidentiary value.  In most cases, the evidentiary value of a cookie is limited to its name. 
Typically, the name of a cookie will match the URL of the site that deposited the cookie, indicating 
that the PC had visited that site at some point in the past.  This does not go to show intent as the cookie 
will be created whether the browser was redirected from another site, or intentionally pointed to the 
site with a typed URL. Dates and times associated with cookies may help to determine when a site was 
visited and can be useful in creating investigative timelines. 
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Temporary Internet files are essentially cached copies of web page components (often graphics) stored 
on the local PC.  The investigative value is that these files are stored locally without the intent or 
intervention of the user, and that some files, for example contraband images, are of evidentiary value 
in and of themselves.  An investigator must keep in mind that these files are easily cleared out by most 
browsing applications, or with third party tools. Most importantly, investigators must weigh the 
potential value against the time it will take to search through even a moderately populated cache.  
Examiners should expect a search of temporary Internet files to take hours or days.  In many cases, 
that requires more time than the examiner has. 
A web browser’s storage of user information and preferences can be a quick source of useful 
information.  In cases where “Internet Explorer” is the browser, the index.dat file can contain a 
running record of sites visited, including access to web based e-mail (but not e-mail content), and even 
local files.  The examples below (some information has been redacted) all represent data pulled from 
an index.dat file in less than five minutes, using a free third-party tool (see Figure 3).  The “User 
Name” in each case, indicates the name of the windows account that “owned” the index.dat file in 
question.  
============================================= 
URL       : http://www.XXXXXX.com 
Title        : New Page 1 
Hits         : 17 
Modified Date     : 10/4/2005 9:05:35 PM 
Expiration Date   : 10/30/2005 9:05:36 PM 
User Name         : xxxxxx 
============================================= 
This example shows a user visiting a site 17 times, most recently on 10/4/2005 
 
============================================= 
URL    : http://images.google.com/images?q=kitties&hl=en 
Title    : kitties - Google Image Search 
Hits      : 7 
Modified Date    : 10/4/2005 9:09:46 PM 
Expiration Date  : 10/30/2005 9:02:38 PM 
User Name        : xxxxxx 
============================================= 
This example shows that a user performed a google image search on the term “kitties” 7 times, most recently on 10/4/2005  
 
============================================= 
URL             : http://us.f307.mail.yahoo.com/ym/ShowFolder?rb=Inbox&reset=1&YY=85059 
Title             : Yahoo! Mail - xxxxxxxx@yahoo.com 
Hits              : 21 
Modified Date     : 10/4/2005 9:06:37 PM 
Expiration Date   : 10/30/2005 9:06:38 PM 
User Name         : xxxxxx 
============================================= 
This example shows a user accessing their yahoo account for the 21st time on 10/4/2005. 
 
============================================= 
URL               : file:///D:/Program%20Files/mIRC/logs/%23Beginner.EFnet.log 
Title             :  
Hits              : 1 
Modified Date     : 10/4/2005 9:44:39 PM 
Expiration Date   : 10/30/2005 9:37:32 PM 
User Name         :xxxxxx 
============================================= 
This example shows the user accessing a file (in this case, an IRC chat log, but could be any type file) on the local drive for 
the first time on 10/4/2005. 
 
Figure 3 - Index.dat Examples 
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4.5.2 E-mail Artifacts  
E-mail artifacts may be of enormous evidentiary value, but can require a very expensive investment in 
time. Procedures for examining e-mail and extracting useful data are usually specific to the particular 
e-mail client, and can be time consuming to implement.  If extraction of e-mail is successful, even a 
cursory screening of all the e-mail in a suspect’s mailbox could take many hours.  If web-based e-mail 
is used, there is often no local storage of e-mail artifacts.  
4.5.3 Instant Messaging Artifacts 
Most instant messaging clients maintain some type of contact information, and have the capability to 
record and store logs of the conversations that take place between the user and his or her online 
contacts.  In most cases, this logging capability is off by default but can, and often is, turned on by the 
user.  Contact information for most IM applications is maintained at the server, and may not be found 
on the local PC.  Chat logs can contain a wealth of data, including the conversation itself, as well as 
the screen names of other parties.  A single chat log may contain hours of conversation.  A thorough 
examination of multiple logs may bear a prohibitive cost in time.  If it is necessary to examine chat 
logs, it is important for the examiner to have a clear idea of what he or she is looking for.  String 
search tools should be implemented as much as possible.  
A “traditional“ examination would likely involve a thorough examination of all of these, and many 
other artifacts.  The mandates of the CFFTPM require that the examiner judiciously evaluate the 
potential benefit of examining each of these artifacts with the time cost of doing so.  
4.6 Case Specific Evidence 
It is important for the computer forensic examiner to be able to adjust the focus of every examination 
to the specifics of that case.  This is a skill set in and of itself, and requires the ability to reconcile a 
number of conflicting requirements in the manner most appropriate not just to a type of case, but to 
each specific set of circumstances.  There are several practices that can facilitate an effective 
optimization of resources. A computer forensic examiner should be able to evaluate time resources, 
utilize pre-raid intelligence, customize search goals, and prioritize search goals.  
Of all the resources available to the examiner, time is usually in shortest supply.  One consideration 
when taking stock is whether the time requirement is “bounded” or “unbounded“.  Is there a defined 
deadline (“bounded”) beyond which the search is halted, or the evidence loses all value?  Is the 
mandate to find evidence as soon as possible, but even if it takes days (“unbounded”)? For example, a 
permissive search might only be allowed until the end of an interview, whereas the search of a missing 
person’s PC might be conducted as rapidly as possible, but still go on for hours.  Time is clearly of the 
essence in both cases, but the lack of a time limit in the unbounded case can justify some avenues of 
investigation that would not be feasible in a bounded situation.  In all cases, time is an expensive 
commodity.  The time cost of any examination activity must be weighed against the potential for 
fruitful results of that activity.  As a general rule, it is usually best to perform those tasks which can be 
accomplished most quickly first. 
The value of planning and pre-raid intelligence cannot be over-emphasized.  Reliable information on 
search terms, contacts, types of activities, applications used, etc. in advance of the search can allow the 
examiner to develop at least some search strategies before arrival on scene.  Every minute saved in this 
manner is potentially another minute available to conduct the search itself.    
It is difficult to say with certainty which specific type of digital artifact is the optimum site to search 
for a given type of case; however some types of artifacts are generally more likely to produce relevant 
information for specific types of cases.  The example cases summarized below are not intended to be a 
comprehensive list of the type of case or of all recommended approaches.   
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5. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
The highest priority should obviously be given to actual instances of child pornography on the drive. 
A graphic viewing utility that quickly displays large quantities of thumbnails from graphic and 
audiovisual files can help speed up the task of searching the drive directly. It may be helpful to take a 
quick look at the directory structure, searching for indications of cataloged, sorted storage of 
contraband material. If Internet activity is involved, many web browser artifacts can be searched fairly 
quickly to identify contact with incriminating web sites.  Instances of child pornography may 
potentially be found in temporary Internet files, however the time required to search through these 
files is likely to be prohibitive. If distribution of child pornography is suspected, it may be prudent to 
search for artifacts associated with IRC FServes or peer to peer file sharing applications (DeBrota, 
2005).  E-mail and USENET newsgroup postings may also be associated with distribution of child 
pornography; however this is often very time-consuming and should be considered carefully. 
6. DRUG ACTIVITY 
A quick search of the drive for spreadsheets, documents or databases is often a sensible use of time 
(unless the number of files found is prohibitive).  These files may contain sales records, customer 
information, drug-making instructions, or lists of precursor chemicals.  If time can be allotted to do so, 
it may be fruitful to examine Internet artifacts for Internet searches on drug-related terms, and for 
online transactions involving purchases of precursor chemicals or equipment. It may be possible to 
find drug-related e-mail or instant messaging artifacts, however this will be time consuming – 
especially so because it will likely require manual screening of message content.  
7. FINANCIAL CRIMES 
A cursory search of the drive for documents and images (specifically images of checks or other 
potentially fraudulent financial instruments) might be at the top of the list.  Documents could include 
invoices or other financial records. Installed financial applications, such as quicken or MS Money and 
their associated records may be a fruitful source of evidence. 
Within the constraints of the factors previously highlighted, the examiner must efficiently prioritize 
the search goals from the beginning.  Some considerations will be constant.  Time and speed will 
almost always be the most important consideration.  Forensically sound practices must always be 
observed. System date and time, and time-zone information from the suspect’s system should always 
be examined and documented.  To the extent practical, the examiner should prioritize search goals to 
focus on applications the suspect is known to have used or reasonably presumed to have used in 
relation to the suspected illegal activity based on available intelligence. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The computer forensic field triage process model (CFFTPM) is a formalization of real world 
investigative approaches that have distilled into a formal process model. At the heart of the model is 
the notion that some investigations are extremely time sensitive; hours can literally mean the 
difference between life and death for a victim or the escape of the suspect. Most law enforcement 
cases today involve digital evidence of some kind. We are truly a digital nation and as such our lives 
(the good and the bad) are reflected in technology and the bits and bytes. Correspondingly, digital 
evidence is a primary source of critical information and investigative leads that are required within the 
first few hours of many investigations. 
While the investigative approaches that were used to develop the model came primarily from child 
pornography cases, the model is general enough to be used across a wide spectrum of investigations. 
The six primary phases of the CFFTPM (planning, triage, usage/user profiles, chronology/timeline, 
email & IM, and case specific evidence) are important in such diverse cases as financial fraud, identity 
theft, cyber stalking and murder. The various sub-phases or tasks under each primary phase need to be 
modified based on the specifics of each investigation.  The tasks and considerations discussed under 
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each of the phases act as examples of the decision making process that needs to take place – sensitivity 
of time vs. quality and importance of the evidence derived. 
The CFFTPM is consistent with the various theoretical models that have been developed within the 
field of digital forensic science. By following the CFFTPM a computer forensic examiner has not 
precluded a more thorough traditional examination and analysis back in the lab. The procedures used 
on site are forensically sound, maintain the chain of custody, and comply with Federal and State rules 
for the admissibility of evidence.  
One of the biggest advantages of the CFFTPM (very practical and pragmatic) is due to the fact the 
model was developed in reverse of most other models in the area. The investigators in the field 
matured their instinctive approaches based on actual trial and error, cases, court decisions and the 
direction from prosecutors. The CFFTPM merely aggregated these approaches and articulated them 
into a more formal methodology; still maintaining the investigative essence and the key components 
that have been battle tested. 
Just as it has been said that “one software tool does not a computer examiner make”, only possessing 
one investigative process model is equally as limiting. Computer forensic examiners need a repertoire 
of tools and just as important, a repertoire of examination and investigative approaches. The CFFTPM 
is not the ultimate solution for every case; it should only be used where appropriate and only after 
carefully weighing the legal and technical considerations that were discussed.  In those instances 
where it has been employed it has been extremely effective! 
“Education never ends, Watson. It is a series of lessons, with the greatest for the last” 
(Sherlock Holmes, The Adventure of the Red Circle) 
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